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STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY  
AND ONLINE COMMERCE 
 
Mark Bartholomew* 
 
It is becoming commonplace to note that privacy and online commerce are on 
a collision course. Corporate entities archive and monetize more and more personal 
information. Citizens increasingly resent the intrusive nature of such data 
collection and use. Just noticing this conflict, however, tells us little. In Informing 
and Reforming the Marketplace of Ideas: The Public-Private Model for Data 
Production and the First Amendment,1 Professor Shubha Ghosh not only notes the 
tension between the costs and benefits of data commercialization, but suggests 
three normative perspectives for balancing privacy and commercial speech. This is 
valuable because without a rich theoretical framework for assessing the tradeoff 
between speech and privacy, important values will be shortchanged by courts 
assessing the constitutionality of commercial data regulation. As Professor Ghosh 
points out, a judicial response that simply argues for the marketplace to sort all this 
out on its own is undertheorized and insufficient.2 
By themselves, the three perspectives articulated by Professor Ghosh do not 
pinpoint how to balance data commercialization and online privacy. Instead, they 
offer a broad view of the policy interests relevant to this balance. Courts deciding 
data privacy cases will need to go further, building doctrinal structures that 
specifically take these policy interests into account. This does not mean, however, 
that courts will need to reinvent the wheel. In this Response, I want to explore an 
already existing doctrinal structure for considering rights in information. My 
particular focus is the field of intellectual property, which has already wrestled, to 
a large degree, with the three perspectives identified by Professor Ghosh.3 Here, I 
will identify one intellectual property regime—the right of publicity—and two 
particular doctrinal innovations—the “transformativeness” test and the 
“newsworthiness” test. These tests are used by courts to determine when an 
                                                            
* © 2013 Mark Bartholomew. Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School. 
1 Shubha Ghosh, Informing and Reforming the Marketplace of Ideas: The 
Public-Private Model for Data Production and the First Amendment, 2012 UTAH 
L. REV. 653 (2012). 
2 See id. at 654–55 (recognizing the “inherent tension between democratic 
values of transparency and accountability and the market goal of wealth creation,” 
and arguing that “regulation of the marketplace of information is consistent with 
freedom of speech”).   
3 In his article, Professor Ghosh offers a thorough description of the existing 
legal structures for owning data, including intellectual property rights. See id. at 
667–91. This Response focuses on a different aspect of intellectual property law: 
how courts, once ownership of data has been established, evaluate expression-
based challenges to such ownership. 
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entity’s First Amendment right to speak should trump a celebrity’s property 
interest in her name, likeness, or other information surrounding her persona. The 
tests are not perfect, but they may prove useful to future courts struggling to 
reconcile new privacy regulations with the expressive interests of commercial 
speakers. 
According to Professor Ghosh, there are three normative frames for assessing 
the First Amendment clash between data commercialization and privacy.4 A 
“classic liberal perspective” posits that the market for online speech is controlled 
by fully autonomous actors.5 Government actors can effectively use their own 
voices to warn consumers of undesirable data collection practices, and consumers 
can simply opt out of such practices. Consequently, there is little need for legal 
safeguards against data collection and use.6 An “autonomy perspective” is not so 
sanguine about market forces.7 More sensitive to intrusions into individual private 
space, this perspective seeks to balance a corporation’s right to speak through 
others’ personal data with an inherent reservoir of personal protected space.8 
Finally, a “fairness perspective” worries about aggregate social balance.9 This 
perspective supports laws that preserve the rights of less powerful marketplace 
actors, particularly consumers, against those whose ability to communicate 
threatens to outstrip other voices.10 
Quite rightly in my opinion, Professor Ghosh faults the Supreme Court for its 
myopic commitment to the liberal perspective and neglect of the autonomy and 
fairness approaches.11 In its 2011 decision, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,12 the Court 
rejected the idea that regulation of the prescribing information held by pharmacies 
was needed to prevent pharmaceutical marketers from gaining too great of an 
advantage in their efforts to appeal to prescribing physicians.13 Instead, the Court 
embraced the liberal perspective, viewing doctors, pharmaceutical marketers, and 
consumers as all equally capable of making informed decisions regardless of the 
marketers’ ability to use prescribing information to generate individually tailored 
commercial appeals.14 
                                                            
4 Id. at 654. 
5 See id. at 705. 
6 See id. at 682–83.   
7 See id. at 668. 
8 See Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 1153, 1161 (2012) (describing discussion on animating values behind First 
Amendment as reflecting, in part, “concern with the autonomy interests of 
individual speakers or listeners in their personal or private affairs”). 
9 Ghosh, supra note 1, at 668. 
10 See id. at 683–84. 
11 Id. at 705–06.   
12 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
13 Id. at 2671–72.  
14 See id.  
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Despite Sorrell,15 the liberal perspective does not invariably hold sway when 
courts attempt to balance commercial speech rights with other concerns. In fact, in 
other situations, courts explicitly consider issues of autonomy and fairness in 
calibrating this balance. A great example of this—one that could translate nicely to 
resolving the tensions between privacy and free speech—is intellectual property 
law. Just as privacy regulation can prevent the speech of others, intellectual 
property laws routinely block unauthorized expression. As I describe in a recent 
article, different intellectual property regimes address free speech concerns in 
different ways.16 These efforts to accommodate the First Amendment reflect 
multiple normative perspectives, not just the classic liberal one. In the space 
remaining here, I will discuss how just one of these intellectual property regimes, 
the right of publicity, addresses free speech through a broader, normative frame 
than that found in the Sorrell decision.17 
“The right of publicity may be defined as [an individual’s] right to the 
exclusive [commercial] use of his or her name or likeness.”18 The right often 
conflicts with the expressive rights of others as celebrities have become common 
subjects for all kinds of discourse. Recognizing this, courts routinely turn to the 
                                                            
15 The Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), 
decision is another example of the liberal approach, blithely assuming that the 
marketplace of ideas offers the same opportunities for communication and 
persuasion, regardless of the technical and economic advantages of particular 
speakers. See id. at 907 (“Factions should be checked by permitting them all to 
speak . . . and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.”). 
One scholar notes that the First Amendment “remains almost completely 
unconcerned with market failure in the marketplace of ideas and with imbalance 
among speakers, their resources, and their persuasive power.” Frederick Schauer, 
Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 917 (2010). 
16 Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of 
Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
17 As Professor Ghosh and I have discussed, the willingness of courts 
adjudicating right of publicity disputes to consider autonomy and fairness concerns 
is a relatively recent development. In fact, in the Supreme Court’s only 
consideration of the right of publicity, Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting 
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court rejected the defendant broadcaster’s First 
Amendment argument, seeming to equate the market for the celebrity performance 
at issue with the market for news reporting. Id. at 567–68. In other words, the 
Court gave short shrift to interests outside of those of the celebrity rights holder. 
See id. Zacchini was a factually unique case, however, involving the rebroadcast of 
an individual’s entire human cannonball act, id. at 563–64, and it has had only a 
limited impact on subsequent publicity rights decisions. See 2 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:27 (2d ed. 2009). 
18 Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 
S.E. 2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982)). 
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First Amendment in resolving right of publicity disputes.19 These decisions do not 
simply assume that the downstream user’s speech rights should triumph. Instead, 
judges have introduced two doctrinal mechanisms—the “transformativeness” and 
“newsworthiness” tests—to satisfy both free speech interests and the interest in 
controlling use of one’s persona. 
In assessing a First Amendment defense to a celebrity’s charge of publicity 
rights infringement, courts examine the “transformativeness” of the defendant’s 
expressive activity. This is an independent and absolute defense to a prima facie 
violation of the right of publicity. The standard is a broad one: “[W]hether the 
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is 
synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum 
and substance of the work in question.”20 Essentially, this is “a balancing test 
between the First Amendment and the right of publicity.”21 
In contrast to the Court’s approach in Sorrell, when applying the 
transformativeness test, courts have demonstrated a nuanced recognition of the 
tradeoffs between free speech and other social interests. Autonomy concerns are 
front and center in these discussions. For example, in evaluating the 
“transformativeness” of an unauthorized painting of Tiger Woods, the Sixth 
Circuit noted not only the First Amendment’s goal of advancing knowledge 
through “a free marketplace of ideas,” but also its “fulfillment of the human need 
for self-expression,” an autonomy interest.22 Similarly, when a federal court 
recently had to determine the duration of publicity rights under New Jersey 
common law, a decision with direct implications for free speech, it noted that “one 
of the rationales for recognizing a right of publicity remains its protection of an 
individual’s interest in personal dignity and autonomy.”23 The plaintiff was the 
purported beneficiary of Albert Einstein’s publicity rights under his will.24 The 
defendant, an advertiser that used Einstein’s image without permission, contended 
that whatever rights the beneficiary held, they were no longer valid since Einstein 
had been dead for over fifty years.25 Ultimately, the court denied the plaintiff’s 
request for a right of longer duration, explaining that “the personal interest that is 
at stake becomes attenuated after the personality dies.”26 Hence, the court adopted 
an autonomy perspective, calibrating the temporal length of the right according to 
one’s personal interest in self-fulfillment. 
                                                            
19 Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 16, at 29–31. 
20 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 
2001). 
21 Id. at 799. 
22 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 955 (6th Cir. 2003). 
23 Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Gen. Motors, LLC., No. CV10-03790, 2012 
WL 4868003, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 Id. at *1. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at *5. 
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Courts have also evaluated the free speech-publicity rights balance from a 
fairness perspective, assessing the power dynamics of the different speakers and 
audiences involved. The Sorrell decision suggested that the only remedy for 
problematic speech (like individualized marketing based on pharmacy prescription 
data) is more speech, regardless of the costs to patients, prescribing doctors, or the 
Vermont health care system.27 The right of publicity’s transformativeness test does 
not assume, however, that more speech is a cure-all for any speech with socially-
deleterious consequences. Instead, it asks whether the speaker is actually making a 
contribution. If not, the speaker loses First Amendment protection because it is not 
actually providing a competing voice. For example, when the Tenth Circuit had to 
decide whether right of publicity claims brought by major league baseball players 
for the unauthorized use of their names and likenesses on parodic baseball cards 
should yield to the First Amendment, it decided whether the cards were 
transformative. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit considered the impact of its decision 
on the allocation of societal resources. Responding to concerns that unauthorized 
uses threatened to cancel out celebrity’s semiotic value, the court distinguished 
between “advertising” uses and uses on merchandise like t-shirts, coffee mugs, or 
the baseball cards at issue.28 Only after assuring itself that the supply of celebrity 
images for public discourse would remain robust, even after the defendant’s uses 
were allowed, did the court uphold the defendant’s First Amendment defense. 
Relatedly, a “newsworthiness” defense to right of publicity claims also 
demonstrates judicial sensitivity to fairness concerns. The defense attempts to 
reconfigure the relationship between speech and celebrity privacy, with the press 
helping balance out the communicative abilities of celebrities with a countervailing 
force. In determining whether the newsworthiness defense is satisfied, a court must 
ask whether the defendant’s expression “concerns a matter of public interest” and 
is “informative.”29 To a large degree, these questions are proxies for a larger 
inquiry into whether the defendant’s use of the celebrity persona represents a 
counterpoint to the celebrity voice or merely another request to engage in a 
commercial transaction. Hence, the newsworthiness defense has been upheld when 
the speech at issue represents some sort of news reporting30 or “editorial 
                                                            
27 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (“Vermont 
may be displeased that detailers who use prescriber-identifying information are 
effective in promoting brand-name drugs. The State can express that view through 
its own speech. But a State’s failure to persuade does not allow it to hamstring the 
opposition. The State may not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public 
debate in a preferred direction.”). 
28 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
974–75 (10th Cir. 1996). 
29 Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 10-03328, 2012 WL 3860819, at *6–7 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (citing Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 
(Ct. App. 1993)). 
30 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309–10 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
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opinion,”31 but it has been disallowed when the defendant was motivated by 
commercial rather than journalistic purposes.32 
So why did the Court in Sorrell ignore the autonomy and fairness 
perspectives? The novelty of the legal issue involved may have caused it to turn to 
a more Brandeisian view of the marketplace of ideas where the only permissible 
remedy for some kinds of speech is more speech. Or the unique legislative history 
of the Vermont statute may have created heightened concern over the content-
based nature of the law. Regardless, additional data privacy legislation is in the 
works, and there will surely be First Amendment challenges to its implementation. 
In the next go around, a closer look at other bodies of law like the right of publicity 
would help the Court realize a richer normative frame like that advocated by 
Professor Ghosh and perhaps offer a better doctrinal structure for bridging the 
privacy-commercial speech divide. 
 
 
                                                            
31 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
32 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
